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Discussion of Robert L. Brown's "Recent Canadian 
Human Rights Decisions Having an Impact on 
Gender-Based Risk Classification Systems" 
Patrick Butler* 
Abstract 
This commentary examines the political and economic influence of demo-
graphic groups on rationales for granting exemption from laws prohibiting 
classification by age or sex, as evidenced in the cases discussed by Robert L. 
Brown. Age is less subject than sex to manipulation for group advantage. In 
Professor Brown's discussion of auto insurance cases, only the influence of 
group dominance can explain: 
• Selective focus on young drivers; 
• Indifference to ongoing overcharging of adult women signaled by undis-
puted 2:1 ratios of cost-related averages; and 
• Avoidance of effective ways to evaluate miles of exposure to risk. 
Contrary to Professor Brown's invitation to actuaries to defend the status 
quo, they are advised to eschew group politics and to acknowledge in legal and 
public discourse all alternatives to an abuse that the car year statistical unit 
makes unavoidable-the shifting of costs from higher to lower mileage cars in 
the same risk class. 
Key words and phrases: age politics, sex politics, car year, car mile, exposure 
units, mileage rating 
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Introduction 
Robert L. Brown is to be commended for opening a timely discussion 
of three recent court decisions that involve challenges by one woman 
and two men to age and sex classifications. In a retirement case the 
court's opinion acknowledged the power balance in age-group politics 
by upholding the age classification. In the two auto insurance cases 
the courts ignored the power imbalance between groups in allowing 
insurance companies to win exemption from law prohibiting unequal 
treatment of individuals by age and sex. 
There are bona fide physical and psychological reasons for age clas-
sifications, as in managing motor vehicle risk. In contrast, so-called sex 
differences in data on driving risk are simply artifacts of group-average 
differences in vehicles and conditions of use. The large differences in 
accident involvement auto insurers use to defend selective sex classifi-
cations are products of misleading time-unit statistics and the fact that 
on an annual basis in each age group women drivers average markedly 
fewer miles of exposure than men drivers average. 
Professor Brown's analysis approving the auto insurance case out-
comes seems to assume that statistical information provided to sup-
port these class decisions is pure, i.e., complete, consistent, not mis-
leading, and apolitical. His analysis thus can bypass the essential fact 
that decision-making by insurance company executives, regulators, and 
courts concerning which risk classes are necessary and what measures 
of exposure are well-founded is de facto dominated by and responsive 
to the needs of members of certain age and sex groups. In particular, 
the claim by representatives of these dominant groups that sex classi-
fication favors women contradicts an axiom of political science and the 
basis for representative government. Buoyed by its emotional appeal (to 
men), the false idea that men are disadvantaging themselves to women's 
benefit in auto insurance pricing is perpetuated largely through pro-
fessional selection and interpretation of statistical information. The 
following commentary augments Professor Brown's analysis from the 
perspective of intergroup politics. 
2 First Case: Dickason 
In the non-insurance case Olive Dickason, a university full professor, 
challenged her mandatory retirement at age 65 as a violation of Cana-
dian law against unequal treatment by age. This case pits a presumably 
small class of senior faculty against a large class of junior faculty that 
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would benefit from the expanded opportunity for promotion created 
by mandatory retirement. Although age is a demographic factor that 
can be misused to excuse invidious and stereotypical treatment, age dif-
fers conclusively from the immutable factors of sex and race because 
it is a sequence through which everyone potentially passes. Therefore, 
a decision to treat individuals differently by age is not necessarily an 
instance of one group gaining an advantage over another group. Junior 
faculty are aware that any age rule they create is likely to govern their 
own retirement. 
This reality is stated in the court's opinion quoted by Professor 
Brown: 
the terms of the collective agreement relating to compulsory 
retirement will [eventually] apply to every member of the 
faculty association. (Added word and emphasis are mine.) 
Professor Brown uses the disposition of this case to bolster the argu-
ment that if bona fide reasons can be found to justify exceptions to law 
prohibiting age classification, then insurance reasons (more respectable 
than simply one group gaining an advantage at the expense of another) 
can be found to justify classification by sex. 
The political difference between age and sex classification is demon-
strated by retirement arrangements such as that in the Dickason case 
prior to enactment of laws against unequal treatment by sex. Manda-
tory retirement age commonly was set at 62 for women and at 65 for 
men. In this instance, the immutability of sex allowed academic and 
non-academic men to gain an advantage at the expense of women in 
applying an age classification. 
3 First Auto Case: Bates 
The first auto insurance case Professor Brown discusses provides a 
good example of the strong influence of age-group politics on classifica-
tion decisions. The case brought by 20 year old Michael Bates involves 
an unsuccessful challenge to price classes defined by driver age, sex, 
and marital status. Professor Brown hints that these classifiers may not 
be applied uniformly. The court, he says, 
noted that single males under the age of 25 had the highest 
claim frequency, the highest loss per car insured, and the 
highest average claim cost of any of the categories for which 
statistics were kept. (Emphasis added.) 
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The truth behind the emphasized clause is that the claim frequency, 
loss per car insured, and average claim cost are not available by driver 
sex for cars whose drivers are over age 25. Through classification by 
driver age, auto insurers have exempted the adult owners of four of five 
cars from paying costs according to the sex of a principal or occasional 
driver. Men benefit from this unisex merging of men's and women's 
annual insurance statistics for the large majority of cars. This fact be-
came apparent, but was not acknowledged, by the court's opinion in 
the Watters case. 
4 Second Auto Case: Watters 
In the second auto insurance case 19 year old Adrian Watters unsuc-
cessfully challenged sex classification as applied to cars with drivers 
under age 25. Professor Brown quotes the five insurance and public 
accident statistical comparisons by the sex of young drivers that the 
court cited to justify its decision. (The fifth comparison is from his 
own expert testimony.) It is necessary, however, to turn to the complete 
published Watters opinion for important adult-driver comparisons by 
sex. In this regard, the court wrote that 
The final interested group is male and female drivers over 
25 years of age. Although the accident ratio of male to fe-
male drivers remains constant at 2:1 across all age groups, as 
was pointed out by Mr. Brown under cross-examination, the 
severity of the accidents involving young males significantly 
exceeds the severity of accidents involving young females 
and older male and female drivers. (Dominion Law Reports, 
Volume 107, page 320. Emphasis added.) 
Professor Brown's testimony on the constancy of this ratio across 
all driver ages is validated by a review of published age and sex data on 
reported accidents during 1984 from 7 million drivers in Pennsylvania. 
In this driver population the ratio had a low of 1.8:1 at age 17, at ages 60 
to 64 and for several age groups between, and had highs of 2.2:1 at age 
25, and 2.1:1 for the 30-35 age group. The absolute involvement values 
per 100 licensed drivers decreased for women from 5 at age 17 to 1 
at age 65. Men's values followed the same pattern at about double the 
value, from 9 to 1.8 involvements per 100 drivers. At all ages the ratio 
of men's to women's involvements in severe accidents as measured by 
fatal accidents was about 3:1 (Butler, Butler, and Williams, 1988, pp. 
253, 269, 271). There is no discontinuity or marked change in relative 
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differences by driver sex in total or severe accidents below and above 
age 25. 
Because men and women apparently average about the same risk 
rates per mile (accident involvements per mile times average severity) 
when driver age and vehicle differences are controlled, the annual ac-
cident ratio is an expression of the ratio of men's to women's annual 
miles of exposure. Although average annual mileages vary strongly with 
driver age, the ratio of men's to women's average mileages is remark-
ably constant at approximately the annual accident involvement ratio. 
In 1990 men's to women's overall average mileage ratio was 1.74:1 (U.S. 
Department of Transportation, 1990 Nationwide Personal Transporta-
tion Survey.) 
5 Classification Alternative: Mileage 
Although the car is the unit of insurance, insurers make no bona fide 
attempt to measure the individual mileages cars are driven. What pro-
vision, therefore, is made for measuring the costs indicated by the large 
difference in group averages for annual accidents and annual mileages? 
The question of practical or superior alternatives to sex as a rating vari-
able plays a prominent part in Professor Brown's analysis. He notes 
from the Watters opinion that the "criteria of annual mileage driven 
was used as an example of a rating variable which could somewhat off-
set the loss of gender as a rating variable." Because simple classification 
of cars at one or several annual mileage break points already is used 
by some insurers (and has been discontinued by others) for providing 
nominal discounts, it is possible to consider the reasons for the opin-
ion that annual mileage classification is not practical for measuring the 
costs underlying the approximately 2:1 ratios of men's to women's an-
nual accidents and mileages. 
Professor Brown's reference to annual mileage driven as a rating 
class criterion is misleading because the class definition does not refer 
to the mileage the car was driven last year. Instead, annual mileage is 
defined in company rate and rule manuals as the mileage to be driven 
in the ensuing year or as future mileage as stated by the insured (or 
filled in by the agent) before the beginning of the policy rating period. 
Future mileage is inherently unmeasurable, and no premium adjust-
ment is made to a low mileage discount at the end of the rating period 
regardless of actual miles driven. Predictably, the resulting cost distinc-
tion between future mileage classes generally conforms to the nominal 
discount size. 
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When the subject of the car mile exposure unit is raised, some pro-
fessionals wrongly equate it with future mileage rating. Although Pro-
fessor Brown's reference is not specific, it is probably not the car mile 
exposure unit but this future mileage rating factor that he justifiably 
rejects as impractical for accurately delineating the difference between 
young men's and women's average costs. Therefore, classifying all cars 
by the sex of a driver needs to be considered as another alternative to 
unisex pricing that charges women on average about twice as much per 
mile as men at all ages for the same insurance protection for their cars. 
6 Classification Alternative: All Cars by Driver Sex 
A change to unisex pricing on the present car year unit basis rep-
resents a group overcharge to young women. The price changes for 
young men and women predicted at the top of the list of five statistics 
Professor Brown quotes from the Watters opinion are considerably less 
than what has happened to some car owners in the states where pricing 
by driver sex has been outlawed, despite efforts by regulators to cap 
the increases to young women. l On the same basis, however, women 
over 25 are being overcharged as a group. If current application of sex 
pricing to a relatively small minority of cars is necessary and justified, 
then the only question is why the accident involvement statistics do not 
require application of sex-divided pricing to all cars. 
One reason is that there is no consumer demand for more and bet-
ter sex discrimination. Both the disparity by sex in adult costs and its 
cause-men's greater average annual mileage-continue to be hidden.2 
Women have good reason in principle and experience to distrust classi-
fication by sex as an unsolicited gift for which unlimited compensation 
will be demanded. Having to pay higher surcharges for a few years as 
I The price increases predicted to occur in Alberta as a result of unisex pricing did 
affect 600,000 young women in Pennsylvania in 1989. But the adult 3 million women 
drivers in that state already were paying unisex prices. As in other states where courts 
have outlawed pricing by driver sex in auto insurance, this change to unisex youth 
prices was understood to benefit men at women's expense, but it has not been followed 
by elimination of sex-divided pricing in health insurance and annuities where insurers 
overtly charge women more than men. 
2 Although the information is available to the courts, its absence from public dis-
cussion of insurance costs apparently allows it to be discounted in court rulings. One 
of the Supreme Court justices on the dissenting side in the Bates case quoted a law 
review summary of state insurance department studies: "Male accident rates remain 
higher than those of female drivers because men, as a group, drive twice as many 
miles as women. When accident figures are calculated on a per-mile basis, the rates 
are comparable." (Dominion Law Reports, Vol. 93, page 366.) 
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young drivers currently supplies many men with a motive to find ways 
of getting even not only personally but also in supporting other public 
and business arrangements that treat women unequally. Sex-priced in-
surance is a powerful promoter of invidious attitudes. Auto insurance 
is used widely to back the threat that women will be hurt by unisex 
equality (as the dominant group defines it). 
The compelling reason for not sex pricing insurance on all cars-a 
reason consistent with established group political and economic power-
is that adult men would lose the benefit of shifting the cost of their 
greater average annual miles of exposure to adult women and insur-
ers would lose the flexibility in price competition for men's business 
that merged costs provide. For the minority of cars where insurance is 
sex-priced, men and women as groups (not individuals) are paying the 
differential costs of their different mileage averages. 
But individual cars are not driven the class average annual mileage. 
Despite the 2:1 ratio of averages, a sizable minority of men drive fewer 
miles and have fewer accidents than women's averages, and a smaller 
minority of women drive more miles and have more accidents than 
men's averages (Butler, Butler, and Williams, pp. 396, 402). Annual 
income distributions for men and women show a similar relationship 
between averages, with a 2.04:1 ratio in 1989, and in the overlaps of 
the averages by proportions of the other sex (1989 U.S. Census Statis-
tical Abstracts, Table 728). Many upper income homemaker, business, 
professional, and managerial women do well under the current car year 
exposure unit system-the cost of their excess mileage is shifted to the 
owners of below average mileage cars in their risk class. Therefore, the 
alternative of pricing all cars by driver sex makes a poor match to the 
accident risk costs of individual driving. The same severe disability, 
however, applies to priCing insurance by driver sex on any subgroup of 
cars. 
7 Alternative Statistical Unit 
Having examined two unsatisfactory alternatives-classifications by 
future mileage or by driver sex for all cars-to current risk evaluation 
practices, we turn to a third. Although Professor Brown does not dis-
cuss my work on the car mile exposure unit (Butler, 1993), he seems 
to be referring to the car mile as an alternative to the car year unit in 
allowing "that an alternative statistical base might exist in 1992," but 
not in 1983 when Bates initiated his case. Nonetheless, the property 
and casualty actuarial literature (Butler, 1993) contains discussions of 
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the car mile unit (exposure medium or base) at least as early as 1929 
when it was judged to be superior to the car year medium. The only 
question raised in 1929 and subsequently has been the practicality of 
odometer auditing. 
As Professor Brown indicates by quoting from the Watters opinion, 
the courts are currently told by experts that "it is impractical in the ex-
treme to individually assess the risk that each person brings to the sys-
tem". But courts are not told that the individual car-not its drivers-is 
the insured unit and that a car brings risk to the system only when it 
is driven. The courts also are not told that measurement of the mile 
by mile transfer of risk to an insurance class pool by individual car use 
simply requires sealing of the car's odometer and annual verification of 
seals and readings. If it is a gross overstatement that the cost of odome-
ter auditing is impractical in the extreme, it is a gross understatement 
of the inherent impossibility, regardless of cost, of measuring empirical 
probabilities for individuals.3 A statistically credible measurement of 
a class risk rate per exposure unit-in cents per car mile (or dollars per 
car year)-can be determined only from an insurer's experienced cost 
of covering a large number of insured car miles (or car years) of expo-
sure for cars in an insurance class (defined, for example, by car use, 
territory, driver age, etc.). Because the car year unit does not measure 
physical exposure to risk, however, risk rates per car year are without 
probability meaning for individuals. That is, an insurance price per car 
year provides no cost-of-risk incentive at the margins where decisions 
are made about making a given trip (Vickrey, 1968). 
In 1992 I studied, for Pennsylvania legislators, the practical aspects 
of an audited car mile exposure unit system for private passenger auto-
mobile insurance. The report was summarized in this journal (Butler, 
1993) and reprinted in full in The Casualty Actuarial Society Forum 
(Summer 1993, pp. 307-338). Noting that the actuarial literature views 
practicality and not theoretical soundness as the barrier to conversion 
to the car mile exposure unit, the reprint introduction suggests that the 
report serve as a framework for renewed, informed consideration of 
the practicality question. (Readers of this discussion can obtain copies 
from me on request.) 
3This is what the public is misled to believe that pricing by driver record can do. The 
so-called actuarial risk class justification is simply an artifact of the car year exposure 
unit: cars driven by higher mileage drivers selectively are concentrated by the random 
processes of accident involvement and traffic citation into the driver-record subclasses. 
With a raised average annual miles of exposure, the subclass claim frequency per car 
year thereby also is raised relative to the class as a whole. Actuarial modeling in 1960 
of this risk concentration process was reviewed by Butler (1993). 
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8 Conclusion 
In his conclusion Professor Brown asserts that "no superior alterna-
tive exists, either in fact or in theory" to the present use of sex cate-
gories in the risk classification system. Confining attention to driver 
classifications based on stereotypes and applied to a minority of cars 
creates an illusion of actuarial precision that obscures the lump-sum 
character of a car year exposure basis. Although the higher income, 
higher mileage beneficiaries of this cover-up are found in all demo-
graphic groups, mileage and accident statistics reveal that the predom-
inant winners are adult men. 
The power of political and economic influence to cause the disap-
pearance of criticism of auto insurance lump-sum pricing is remark-
able. For example, two eminent economists made this criticism nearly 
30 years q.go. The first paper, published in 1967 with Professor Oliver E. 
Williamson as first author, lists definitions of automobile classification 
categories (class-plan classes were more numerous then than now), but 
concludes (pp. 247-248): 
Despite this multitude of rate classifications, however, no 
effort is made to adjust rates within categories according 
to the volume of activity. Thus our judgment holds that 
the insurance premium has mainly lump-sum characteristics 
.... That the premium has a lump-sum rather than marginal 
character thus leads to the result that the individual operates 
either at the origin [zero activity] or at [an excessive level], 
but has no incentive to take up [the socially optimal level]. 
The following year, Professor William Vickrey (1968, p. 470) pub-
lished the same conclusion about the lump-sum character of premiums 
and its negative effect on incentives: 
[T]he frequently overlooked fact [is] that the manner in which 
premiums are computed and paid fails miserably to bring 
home to the automobile user the costs he imposes in a man-
ner that will appropriately influence his decisions .... [T]hey 
provide incentives that are largely inappropriate at the mar-
gins where decisions are actually made as to whether to 
maintain a car and whether to make a given trip by car. 
Although these two papers continue to be cited as authority for the eco-
nomic efficiency rationale for making auto liability insurance compul-
sory and unlimited, there has been little mention of the fact emphasized 
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by both papers that auto insurance premiums are calculated virtually 
without regard to the number of miles individual cars are driven. 
Actuaries, especially those in academia, may choose to engage in un-
critical defense of the status quo and to keep the code of silence about 
who benefits from the present system. Or they can eschew group poli-
tics and constructively engage with published well-founded criticism of 
the car year exposure unit. Car mile exposure unit analysis has the po-
tential for explaining failures in the current system, such as risk class 
dysfunction in pricing the effects of car weight and safety devices on 
risk rates. 
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Authors' Reply to Discussion 
Robert L. Brown 
I apologize to my audience as I write this response because, if 
you were to check my references, you would find them sadly outdated. 
I thought that the idea of using a classification system based on mileage 
had died a natural death. But it has not. I also apologize to Patrick 
Butler because he will find nothing new in my response. Dr. Butler 
and other proponents long have argued the legitimacy of mileage as a 
rating variable. Their ideas have been placed into the public forum at 
rate hearings, tribunals, court cases, state legislative hearings etc., etc. 
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But to no avail. Why? Perhaps it is a male conspiracy. Perhaps it is the 
logic of the opposing argument. I will let the reader decide. 
What we all agree on is that insureds who bring higher loss costs 
to the risk pool should pay higher prices; those with lower loss costs 
should pay lower prices. Prices based on loss costs are socially neutral. 
Loss costs do not involve social judgments or sexual stereotypes. 
Do insurers charge women lower rates? Yes. Under age 25, gender is 
a recognized risk variable. Over age 25, if the only operator is a woman, 
there is a discount. But should we use mileage instead of gender? 
To say that insurers do not recognize mileage in their rates is wrong. 
Insurers admit that mileage is a useful and valid indicator of exposure 
to auto rates. It is used by insurers, to the extent practical, in defining 
driver classes. For example, there are different rating categories for 
pleasure versus business use that are proxies for mileage. Most com-
panies having different rates for a long commute to work versus a short 
commute. For youthful drivers a distinction is made between principal 
operators and occasional operators, another proxy for mileage. 
Mileage cannot substitute, however, for gender as a rating variable 
in determining fair insurance prices. Why? 
Even after adjusting completely for mileage, there is still an impor-
tant gender component both in frequency and severity of accidents; see, 
for example, u.s. Department of Transportation (1973), National Asso-
ciation of Independent Insurers (1983), The California Driver Fact Book 
(several), and the Traffic Injury Research Foundation (1990). There can 
be as much as a 60 percent difference in loss costs, even after adjusting 
for mileage driven. 
Second, premium rates must be determined at the beginning of the 
exposure period, before the loss experience has unfolded. When asked 
expectations of future mileage, there is overwhelming evidence that 
consumers of auto insurance (often aided by their agents) antiselect 
against the insurer. Ask any company that has a single-break rating 
system based on mileage what percentage of their insureds expect to 
drive just a few miles less than the breakpoint in the next year. As the 
Government Accounting Office has testified: "it may be difficult to get 
reliable information from insureds on the mileage they drive once they 
realize that their insurance premiums depend on what they report". 
Mileage without gender makes no provision for determining insur-
ance premiums for more than one driver of an insured car. 
Young male drivers drive fewer miles than most adult risk classes, 
yet are disproportionately represented in claim statistics. Among young 
drivers, the actual and reported mileage differences between men and 
women are minimal, yet the accident records are measurably different. 

